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ABSTRACT
Central and Eastern Europe is the last world region to transition
towards democracy. Today, it shows alarming signs of de-
consolidation, most prominently in Hungary, Poland, and Serbia.
This article assesses whether these observations form part of a
systematic pattern across the region. It relies on newly-updated
objective data from the Democracy Barometer for the period
between 1990 and 2016. It revisits evidence for the three most
prominent explanations of democratic backsliding in the region:
the rise of populist parties, the incapacity of the European Union
to secure democracy once pre-accession incentives weaken, and
the global financial crisis.
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Never before in history has a greater extent of the world been under democratic rule than
today. In spite of this, political observers are deeply concerned with the global state of
democracy (Merkel 2015). In particular, many accounts highlight problems in the last
regional cluster of countries to democratise: the post-communist countries in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE). After an initially rapid transition towards democracy in the
1990s, the region has shown worrying signs of de-consolidation, and has, in recent
years, even been diagnosed as being on the edge of an authoritarian backlash.
Recent political developments have further stoked fears about democratic backsliding1
in the CEE region, even resulting in assessments that they may herald the beginning of a
new, reversed wave of democratisation (Diamond 2015; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018; Mounk
2018; Snyder 2018). In particular, political parties with illiberal programmes have entered
government not only in Poland, Hungary, and Serbia, but also in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and
most recently in the Czech Republic (Rupnik 2007, 2018; Enyedi 2016; Kelemen 2017;
Mounk 2018). In some cases, they have subsequently exploited the weakness of the
media and judiciary to strengthen partisan control over the state, for example in Macedo-
nia and Serbia (e.g. Esen and Gumuscu 2016; Bieber 2018). The region’s international and
economic environment further reinforce these warnings: While external actors – in particu-
lar the European Union – have been important for promoting democracy in the region in
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the past (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Agarin, 2020), they seem unable to guar-
antee the same incentives in the long run (Carothers 2015). In addition, the repercussions
of the global financial crisis have weakened both democracy at home, as well as the
capacity of external actors to implement their democracy agenda (Armingeon and Guth-
mann 2014; Morlino and Quaranta 2016).
Many of these pessimistic accounts are based on qualitative assessments of single
countries (e.g. Enyedi 2016; Krekó and Enyedi 2018; Pehe 2018) or on the observation
of trends across small sets of cases. These often include the same set of cases: Mečiar
and Fico in Slovakia, Orbán in Hungary, and the Kaczynskis in Poland (Brusis 2016; Busti-
kova and Guasti 2017; Grzymala-Busse 2017; Kelemen 2017; Luce 2017; Rupnik 2018; but
see Cianetti, Dawson, and Hanley 2018). In contrast, the few existing quantitative investi-
gations of recent democratic developments have either focused on Latin America (Huber
and Schimpf 2016b) or they include only a few EU members from Central and Eastern
Europe (Huber and Schimpf 2016a; Huber and Ruth 2017).2 Studies with global samples
face difficulties of distinguishing between potentially strongly diverging processes such
as the entrenchment of authoritarian systems or backsliding in the quality of democracy
(e.g. Lührmann et al. 2018).
Contributing to this debate, we identify and assess the state of the quality of democracy
in all 19 democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.3 In addition to taking stock of recent
changes, we assess their associations with the most prominently-cited explanatory factors
behind purported democratic backsliding in the region. In particular, we investigate three
widely-cited explanations: first, the increasing role of anti-elite, populist parties in govern-
ment; second, the European Union’s fatigue with efforts to sustain improvements in the
quality of democracy once an applicant state has joined the Union; and, third, the
financial crisis of 2008, which has deeply affected the economies of CEE countries and
which has had serious repercussions not only for their political systems, but also for the
capacity of the European Union and its democratic agenda.
Our regional focus on Central and Eastern Europe offers three advantages: First, as
earlier research has found important differences in the effect of populism on democracy
between consolidated and weak democracies (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012a, 18–
26, 2012b), the recent transition of the region towards democracy offers a set of similar
cases for comparison. Second, it also offers crucial variance for the most prominent expla-
nations for the purported backsliding. On the one hand, Central and Eastern European
democracies have experienced a strong influence of populist actors (Grzymala-Busse
2017) from all ideological families, thus enabling a more systematic assessment of their
relationship with democracy than regions dominated by populists of the right (Western
Europe) or the left (Latin America). On the other, it also offers the opportunity to assess
the role of external factors, in a region where EU accession processes are linked to a pol-
itical agenda of promoting liberal democracy (Schimmelfennig 2005). Third, the investi-
gation of gradual changes in the quality of democracy enables us to focus on the most
crucial process in the region, leaving aside inter-regime transitions that are more relevant
in other contexts.
For our analysis, we rely on the Democracy Barometer dataset. This has two advantages,
First, it is based overwhelmingly on objective or survey data and thus allows us to avoid
the known problems of expert surveys (e.g. Silva and Littvay 2019) – often recruited
among academics with strong liberal-democratic norms. Second, it is suited for an
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assessment of the Quality of Democracy in a fine-grained, disaggregated fashion, along
nine principles. We have extended the data to cover the period until 2016 across 70
democracies, including 19 in Central and Eastern Europe (Merkel et al. 2018).
Our results indicate that the widespread public perception of a deep crisis of democracy
in Central and Eastern Europe may be exaggerated. While improvements in the quality of
democracy that started in the 1990s have indeed faltered, and while some democratic
functions are under threat in some countries, this does not appear to constitute a
general trend towards the deterioration of democratic quality across the region.
However, according to our data, in several countries authoritarian leaders or governing
parties have left a significant mark on two functions of democracy: the rule of law and
the freedom of the press. In particular, concern seems appropriate about press freedom,
transparency, competition, and the rule of law in Moldova, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Ukraine, and Hungary. Vice-versa, European integration has been able to foster
some principles of democracy in the course of the EU accession process, but the EU has
no powers in preventing post-accession backsliding under populist governments.
In the rest of this paper, we proceed as follows. First, we introduce the term “quality of
democracy”, discussing both its conceptualisation and operationalisation with the newly-
updated Democracy Barometer dataset. Second, we use this dataset to empirically trace
recent trends in the quality of democracy in all 19 countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, identifying both countries displaying major transformations, as well as the demo-
cratic functions most strongly affected. Third, we take advantage of a large set of new data
sources to trace the importance of the three suspected drivers behind recent democratic
reversals in the countries of the region: populist actors in and outside government, post-
EU accession fatigues, and the 2008 financial crisis. In our last section, we conclude and
compare our findings to the results of expert-based assessments.
2. The quality of democracy
Central to our purpose of tracing recent democratic developments in Central and Eastern
Europe is the concept of quality of democracy. Before starting our empirical endeavour,
this section introduces its conceptualisation and subsequently presents how we operatio-
nalise it using a newly-updated version of the Democracy Barometer.
The concept of quality of democracy only applies to political regimes which fulfil minimal
democratic criteria. It allows us not only to distinguish to what degree these regimes fulfil
ideals established in democratic theory, but also to identify potential democratic deficits
(cf. Diamond and Morlino 2004; Morlino 2004). Hybrid regimes, which at best display only a
democratic facade, do not fulfil the minimal democracy criteria, rendering the concept of
quality of democracy inappropriate in these cases. This caveat is especially important for
our study period – after the end of the Cold War – as it brought about the rise of political
regimes which conduct regular elections, but are only superficially democratic (Diamond
2002). These countries – regional cases thereof are Belarus or Russia – are not captured by
our concept of the quality of democracy and a priori excluded from all analyses.
Merkel’s (2004) and Diamond and Morlino’s (2004) concepts of “quality of democracy”
build on mid-range concepts of democracy which go beyond the electoral principle and
also incorporate further liberal functions of democracy, such as the rule of law or an active
political society. This more extensive, yet procedural concept explicitly foresees a number
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of trade-offs between the realisation of different functions of democracy found in specific
types of democracy. For example, while majoritarian democracies put an emphasis on
stable governments and the responsiveness of democracy to the median voter, consensus
democracies emphasise a broad and inclusive system of representation (see, for instance
Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000; Bochsler and Kriesi 2013).
The specific concept of quality of democracy which we use in this paper is based on an
encompassing set of operationalizable functions of democracy. At its core, it relies on the
functions of democratic control and decision-making. These include institutions which
make the government accountable to citizen preferences (through competitive elections),
which make this process inclusive (for example, through universal suffrage and inclusive
representation), and which encourage broad participation in it. These, in turn are
embedded in democratic rights and freedoms, as well as checks and balances, including
assurances of free political debate, basic civil rights (personal liberty, freedom of
expression and of information, freedom of religion, economic and social rights), the rule
of law, limitations to the power of governments, provisions for transparent government
procedures, and horizontal checks on government (parliamentary procedures, indepen-
dent courts, bicameralism, federalism, central bank independence). A further indispensa-
ble function is provided by pluralist intermediaries between state and society, including the
media, the public sphere, and civil society. Finally, to maximise the quality of democracy,
governments should not be subject to extra-constitutional actors, such as the military, but
should have actual power to govern. All functions combine both formal constitutional rules
(establishing the legal environment for democracy), and democratic practices (for
example, effective electoral competition, or the absence of state-based or private repres-
sion of journalists).
Most of the existing literature on democratic backsliding relies on measures of democ-
racy that broadly differentiate between democracies, authoritarian regimes, and inter-
mediate cases on one or two dimensions. The most commonly-used measures are the
Polity IV, the Freedom House, and the V-Dem index of democracy (Freedom House
2018; Lührmann et al. 2018), although a small number of articles rely on other sources
(Morlino and Quaranta 2016; Börzel and Schimmelfennig 2017). On all of these indices,
Central and Eastern European democracies usually obtain stable ratings at the top end
of the scale and, with few exceptions, were already doing so years before EU accession.
This article aims for a more nuanced assessment which allows us to incorporate specific
transformations of the quality of democracy into our study.
In order to identify such changes in the quality of democracy, we rely on the Democ-
racy Barometer dataset (Bühlmann et al. 2012). Mirroring our concept, the Democracy
Barometer conceives of democracy as based on individual freedom, equality, and
actual degree of control the government possesses over the state. It builds on a
total of 105 indicators primarily from objective sources and representative surveys
rather than expert assessments. They are grouped along nine primary functions of
democracy: individual liberties, rule of law, the public sphere, competition, mutual con-
straints, governmental capabilities, transparency, participation, and representation.
Each indicator is coded so that the majority of its values, and the aggregate scores
for each function, lie between 0 and 100 (see Bühlmann et al. 2012; Merkel et al.
2018, for details).
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3. Trends in the quality of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, 1990–
2016
We start our empirical analysis with a descriptive assessment of the quality of democracy
in the 19 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, beginning with the year of democratisa-
tion (usually 1990 or shortly thereafter), up to 2016. Except for Belarus and Russia, all
Central and Eastern European countries can be considered democracies, according to
Polity IV (minimal Polity IV score of 6).4
Figure 1 plots the overall trends for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe by demo-
cratic function. There is a clear positive trend since the 1990s, with the region making
advances with regards to competition, transparency, and the public sphere. However,
this upwards trend has slowed down markedly since around 2000, with some democratic
functions even appearing to show decreases. Furthermore (similar to the new democracies
in Latin America (cf. Bochsler and Juon 2018)) the countries in Central and Eastern Europe
clearly have not attained a similarly high level of democratic quality as the established
democracies in Western Europe. Most remarkably, there is a deep crisis of the rule of
law (and to a somewhat lesser degree, the public sphere) in Central and Eastern
Europe. However, to the extent that these reversals can be captured by our indicators,
relying on objective data rather than expert-coding, our findings contradict recent
claims by academics and political analyses of a widespread backsliding against the
quality of democracy in the region (Bustikova and Guasti 2017; Rupnik 2018). Indeed,
no such general trend can be observed on any of the nine functions of democracy
which we assess, at least as regards the time period until 2016 which is included in our
analysis.
Figure 2 unpacks these regional averages to reveal country-specific trajectories,
showing separate trends for each of the 18 Central and Eastern European countries for
which we have data (excluding Kosovo, due to missing data).5 Reflecting the regional
average, the quality of democracy has remained stable or improved on most functions
of democracy in most countries, in particular in two Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania), in
Poland, and in Slovenia – though in each of the countries with significant (enduring) weak-
nesses.6 However, there are temporary fluctuations in some of the indicators (especially
those measuring government capacity – this is partly related to measurement issues).
Figure 1. The development of the quality of democracy by region (mean values).
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The subsequent analysis focuses primarily on important instances of backsliding, rather
than on persistent democratic shortcomings.
Figure 2. The development of the quality of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, by countries.
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As regards particular democratic functions, the most systematic development, observa-
ble in several countries, is the erosion of the rule of law. Our measure for the rule of law
reached its peak in the late 1990s, with several countries establishing a truly independent
judiciary and with landmark judgments signalling to governments that the courts consti-
tuted a genuine limit to government power (Bugarič and Ginsburg 2016), though suffering
from significant informal infringements elsewhere (e.g. Bugarič and Kuhelj 2015).
However, since the 2000s, we observe a erosion of the rule of law in countries such as Slo-
vakia, Ukraine, Bulgaria (since 2000), Romania (around 2012–2013), and in Albania (since
2011). The underlying reasons for this are not only institutional changes, but also govern-
ment infringements on the judiciary in practice, including replacements of members of the
judiciary with party loyalists (Bugarič and Ginsburg 2016). Other symptoms of this process
are significant backlashes against judicial independence and an immense drop in public
confidence in the judiciary and police.
A further noteworthy development is the drastic reduction of political competition in
three countries in the 2010s. In all three, this was related to the surge of a new, dominant
leader and political party. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz-KDNP alliance won a
landslide election victory in 2010, gaining a 68% supermajority in parliament (cf. Sata
and Karolewski 2020). In Romania, the Romanian Social Liberals of Victor Ponta became
dominant after the 2012 elections (59% of the seats). In Serbia, the Serbian Progress
Party won 29% of the seats in 2012 and has dominated politics since 2014 with a 63%
majority in parliament. While the changes in these countries are suggestive, they clearly
do not represent an overall regional trend.
On other democratic functions, the developments are even more heterogeneous, with
recent decreases appearing to reflect country-specific circumstances rather than a regional
trend: First, there has been a recent drop in participation in several countries, in particular
in the Czech Republic after 2001 and in Hungary after 2014, driven by the curtailing of
suffrage through new electoral rules. Second, there has been an erosion of transparency
in Hungary since 2009 and in Serbia since 2015. Both countries have reduced press
freedom (Huszka 2018). In Hungary the transparency of government communication
has also suffered. Third, individual liberties deteriorated in Ukraine and in Moldova in
2014, culminating in riots. They have also been under threat in Slovakia since 2005 with
de-facto violations of political liberties and reported cases of torture. Fourth, the public
sphere has deteriorated in several countries. Croatia experienced an erosion of its civil
society and of economic interest groups in the 2010s (as indicated by declining member-
ship numbers). In Estonia, the press has become increasingly politically unbalanced since
2002.
Overall, our analysis finds both parallels and differences in the development of the
quality of democracy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It does not
support the notion of an overall regional deterioration in the quality of democracy,
however. On the one hand, the upwards trend of the 1990s has certainly stopped,
and, as regards several specific countries in the region, has reversed direction.
However, the general trend of democratic backsliding, alleged by country experts, is
not reflected across countries and functions, at least not in the objective indicators
on which the Democracy Barometer dataset relies and at least not in the time period
we are able to consider (until 2016). In other parts of the region, the quality of democ-
racy has even improved, although this process was usually similarly limited to some
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democratic functions. While our data thus contradicts pessimistic judgements for the
whole region, the time period covered does not allow us to consider more recent
alleged impairments of checks and balances and the liberal rights regime through con-
stitutional changes and non-constitutional infringements of individual and minority
rights between 2017 and 2018 (Sandurski 2019).
4. The three processes behind democratic changes in CEE
Having mapped the heterogeneous democratic developments in the CEE region, we
now proceed to analyse the processes behind them. In particular, we consider the
three most prominently-cited factors behind purported democratic backsliding in the
region: first, populist-authoritarian parties in government and in opposition; second,
reduced incentives to uphold liberal democratic principles after EU accession; and,
third, political repercussions of the global financial crisis of 2008. In order to do so, we
have collected data for each of these three factors and descriptively investigate their
associations with democratic changes in our sample. In our main text, we focus on
the four functions of democracy for which our data show the highest variance: Individual
liberties, rule of law, competition, and transparency.7 While sample limitations prevent
us from conducting a causal investigation and from considering interrelated effects,
our systematic bivariate investigation nevertheless enables us to trace patterns and
serves as a plausibility test for the three explanations. The discussion highlights the
most influential cases driving these developments, as well as the heterogeneity
between individual countries.
4.1. Process 1: authoritarian-populist governments
The first widely-cited regional driver of democratic changes, especially of recent ero-
sions of the quality of democracy, are authoritarian leaders, linked to the emergence
of strong populist parties. In Central and Eastern Europe, they played an important role
long before populism spread over the continent. Some of these parties were populist
with an emphasis on identity politics, in particular the nationalist parties in the
Western Balkans (e.g. the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, in Croatia; the Serbian
Radical Party, SRS, in Serbia; or the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation,
VMRO, in Macedonia). In other countries, authoritarian leaders were political entrepre-
neurs combining populist ideology with centrist or mainstream political positions.
Some rose quickly and became the new political elites, such as the former Bulgarian
king Simeon Sakskoburgotski (prime minister 2001-2005), or newcomer political
parties in several of the Baltic states (Sikk 2012; Hanley and Sikk 2016). However, it
was only after the transformation of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz into a populist-authoritarian
party in Hungary and its rise to power in the 2010 elections that populism was dis-
cussed as a threat to liberalism and democracy.
We define populism as a “thin ideology”: populists juxtapose a supposedly “homo-
geneous people” with an elite class they portray as corrupt and as dominating politics,
the economy, society in general and/or the media (Mudde 2004). This defining feature
of populism can be combined with diverse “thick” ideologies (e.g. identity politics/nation-
alism, socialism, conservative thought) or issue positions, for example those of the far-left
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(March 2011), the far-right (Mudde 2011; Huber and Schimpf 2016a), and the political
centre (van Kessel 2015). Thereby, the defining features of populism are anti-liberal,
Figure 3. Populists in opposition (left), in government (middle), and in dominant governments (right)
and trends in the quality of democracy.
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anti-pluralist and anti-democratic, and it can transform or damage democracy (Mudde and
Rovira Kaltwasser 2012a). Furthermore, it also closes the door to external actors promoting
democracy (Carothers 2015).8
To identify populist parties, and in line with our definition of populism, we relied on
existing sources9 (Hawkins 2009, 2013; March 2011; Mudde 2011; van Kessel 2015;
Hawkins and Silva 2016; Huber and Schimpf 2016b, 2016a), and combine them to maxi-
mise coverage,10 partly using temporal extrapolation.11 Based on an underlying party-
level coding (which included all parties with at least 2% of the seat share in the first
chamber of parliament), we then created our country-level variables for populist parties
in government and opposition, discarding country years where we could not account
for the populism status of a significant share of parties.12
Figure 3 identifies the footprints of populists in opposition (left panel), in government
as partners or majority parties (middle), and in electorally dominant governments (right).
13 It shows the trends for (uninterrupted) years of populist activity, with the number of
years that populist actors have been in government or in opposition on the X-axis. Multiple
populist time spans within the same country are included as separate cases. The trend esti-
mates in Figure 3 and all subsequent figures (in red) are based on bivariate models with
period-fixed effects; we interpret them when they show a substantially important
change.14 Populist governments with at least two-thirds of parliamentary seats have a par-
ticularly dominant role, which in many countries corresponds to the threshold for chan-
ging the constitution.
Populist footprints leave three observable marks on the quality of democracy. First, we
find a drop in the rule of law in four countries right after populist administrations enter
office. This is the case for Vasile Tarlev (Moldova, 2001), Mirek Toplánek (Czech Republic,
2006), Robert Fico (Slovakia, 2006), and Boyko Borisov (Bulgaria, 2009). In Ukraine, the rule
of law is already extremely weak at the beginning of the second Timoshenko adminis-
tration in 2007, and only drops slightly further (see Figure 1). However, as the comparative
analysis also shows, there does not appear to be a homogeneous relationship between
populist governments and developments of the rule of law. Instead, there is considerable
fluctuation in the trend, and the presence of pure downward trends is rather the exception
than the rule.
Second, under some populist cabinets, transparency deteriorates. This is the case for Ivo
Sanader in Croatia (2003), Robert Fico in Slovakia (2006), Viktor Orbán in Hungary (2010)
and Beata Szydło in Poland (2014). Again, this authoritarian footprint is not homogeneous.
Other populist administrations, have boosted, rather than weakened the transparency of
rule, e.g. the right-wing populist cabinets of Adrian Năstase and Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu
in Romania (2000-2007). This goes back to a period when the Romanian government’s
primary agenda was access to EU membership.
Third, competition drops sharply when populist governments take office in Hungary
(after 2010), Bulgaria (after 2009 and in 2015) and Moldova (in 2001). In Hungary, the
victory of the Fidesz was accentuated by an electoral system with partly majoritarian fea-
tures, which created a huge discrepancy in the representation of the governing party and
the opposition – the Fidesz party won 68% of the seats with only 53% of the votes. In all
these cases, the drop in our measure of competition is partly due to the effective domi-
nance over the party system by populist parties, and partly because of changes to electoral
rules and rules on party funding.
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While the populist critique of the state of liberal democracies aims to strengthen ver-
tical accountability at the expense of strong horizontal checks and balances, we find
that this critique in some of the countries disguises the real impact of populists on democ-
racy. When populist governments do change the institutional setup of democracy, they
also target aspects of democracy which are crucial for citizen control over their govern-
ment, such as party funding rules or freedom of the press.
However, in our sample, populism is neither a sufficient, nor a necessary condition for
any of the erosion in the quality of democracy: the rule of law is also seen to suffer under
some of the non-populist governments, e.g. Albania (2010-2016) or Hungary (1999-2002).
Freedom of the press and government transparency can similarly also suffer in non-popu-
list politics, e.g. Poland (1996-1999) or Hungary (1999-2001). For all other functions of the
quality of democracy, the trends under populist governments are even more hetero-
geneous. The same applies for periods where populist governments govern with a two-
thirds majority in parliament, or for those where populists emerge as viable opposition
forces.15
These patterns do not allow us to reject the explanation that populist rule has trans-
formed democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. However, they show that populist gov-
ernments differ significantly with regards to our research question, and that the
relationships between populist rule and the quality of democracy are strongly context-
dependent (cf. Agarin 2020). Across countries, the targets of populist governments vary,
and in several contexts our data has not picked up alterations in democratic practices,
at least not yet. In particular, the populist-authoritarian backslides remain limited to
countries with only weak EU membership perspectives (Moldova, Ukraine), or to periods
after CEE countries have acceded to the European Union.
4.2. Process 2: EU political integration and post-accession backsliding
According to a second line of argument, declines in the quality of democracy in Central
and Eastern Europe are directly related to processes occurring in post-EU-accession
periods. In this reasoning, before granting membership, the EU is able to render any dee-
pening of European integration conditional on political criteria. Among other factors, the
Union demands that prospective members improve their democratic, human rights, and
minority protection credentials, and that they enshrine the rule of law (Pevehouse 2002;
Dimitrova and Pridham 2004; Freyburg and Richter 2010; Kolev 2020). While these
effects might be less important for liberal political parties, with a democratisation
agenda, EU conditionality could play a peculiar role in countries with a mixed government
between liberal and authoritarian parties (Schimmelfennig 2005). Once a country has
achieved membership, as is the case for 11 countries in the region, this conditionality
mechanism vanishes. While the Union has a limited range of sanctions at its disposal,
they are not very effective, politically costly, and difficult to activate, requiring a unanimous
decision after a lengthy procedure.
Recent regional developments illustrate this reasoning. The EU disciplinary proceedings
against Poland and Hungary, activated in 2017 and 2018 due to their systemic threats to
the rule of law, have remained largely ineffective. As long as the two countries’ govern-
ments back each other, the necessary unanimity for disciplinary sanctions cannot be
reached. In addition, the financial crisis of 2008 has put the success story of
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democratisation, European integration, and liberal markets into question, especially in
Central and Eastern Europe. There, popular hopes that democracy would also deliver econ-
omic welfare gave way to disappointment, also spawning doubt in democracy as a politi-
cal system (Mishler and Rose 1996; Brusis 2016; Bochsler and Hänni 2019).
As regards previous evidence, several qualitative studies come to the conclusion that
the EU cannot prevent the erosion of democracy and the deterioration of the rule of
law, media and academic freedom in some of its new member states (Kelemen 2017;
Enyedi 2018). However, there is no systematic evidence for a drastic anti-liberal turn
after countries access the European Union. Börzel and Schimmelfennig (2017) do not
find any significant and systematic trends in the level of democracy, once new member
states have accessed the Union, although other studies indicate that after this crucial
moment, the speed at which new members implement pro-democratic reforms slows
down (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010). However, Levitz and Pop-Eleches’ analysis only
includes two post-accession years, and stops before the global financial crisis of 2008,
while Börzel and Schimmelfennig rely on means across countries in the region, assuming
homogeneity in the pre – and post-accession effects.
Different from these analyses, we employ our new multi-dimensional measure of the
quality of democracy, tracing heterogeneous developments, and distinguish between
periods of conditionality and post-accession. In particular, we assume that conditionality
is in play only before countries make the step towards a higher level of integration,
while post-accession fatigue only becomes a factor after countries have reached a more
intensive degree of integration. To assess the role of conditionality and EU accession,
Figure 4. EU political integration and trends in the quality of democracy (selected functions) (For all 9
functions, see appendix, figure B2).
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we use the four levels of integration identified by Börzel and Schimmelfennig (2017):
Association Agreements, weakly credible accession perspectives, credible accession per-
spectives, and EU membership.16
Figure 4 assesses the development of democratic functions in the time period including
the 5 years before and the 10 years after the four steps of EU integration, focusing again on
the most volatile dimensions of the quality of democracy (see appendix B2 for a full assess-
ment). In brief, it indicates that EU integration is a success story for the quality of democ-
racy before membership is achieved, although the trajectories become heterogeneous
thereafter.
A first insight is that significant advances in democratic qualities occur right before
countries are offered weakly credible accession perspectives, which is due to important
reforms passed at these crucial points in time. These advances are related to several demo-
cratic functions. One case, which drives this effect in particular, in the field of competition,
is Croatia. It has reformed its electoral system, while Albania improved its rules on party
funding in 2000. Competition also de facto improved in Romania in 1992, in Macedonia
in 1998, and in Albania and Croatia in 2000-2001. In the fields of individual liberties, the
rule of law and the public sphere, the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania)
passed their post-Soviet constitutions in 1992/1993, or reinforced pre-Soviet constitutions
with more expansive provisions. In particular, they introduced or reinstated constitutional
rules concerning the protection of individual liberties, and rights and liberties related to
public communication, the independence and professionalism of the justice system and
public trials. Albania experienced a significant improvement in the area of law and
order in 1998, after public security was reformed in 1997. In contrast, transparency
improved in several countries (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia)
right after they were granted weakly credible accession perspectives, rather than before.
A second major improvement across multiple cases and dimensions occurs in the years
before countries are offered credible accession perspectives: Representation became more
inclusive in Poland in 1993, in Albania in 2001, and in Macedonia in 2002. Political compe-
tition intensified in Romania in 1993, in Latvia in 1996, in Lithuania 1997, and in Bosnia–
Herzegovina in 2001. In many places, constitutions were also amended at these points
in time, guaranteeing freedoms related to the public sphere. This concerned, in particular
freedoms of association, assembly speech and/or of the press, for example in Latvia in
1997, in Lithuania and Poland in 1993, and in Slovenia in 1994. Furthermore, the public
sphere improved de facto in Croatia in 2002. Similarly, transparency increased due to
improvements in press freedom (legally and de facto), and due to party finance disclosure
rules in several countries (Poland in 1991 and 1993, in Slovenia in 1994, Estonia and Latvia
around 1993-1995, and Lithuania by 1997). Hungary lifted legal restrictions on freedom of
information between 1990 and 1992. Croatia lifted restrictions on freedom of information
around 2000-2003, and introduced effective press freedom, both legally and in practice. In
neighbouring Serbia-Montenegro, this step occurred simultaneously, but was less success-
ful: in 2003, press freedom was under threat, and corruption prevailed.
In contrast to advances due to accession perspectives, EU membership itself is not sys-
tematically associated with improvements in the quality of democracy, with our measures
failing to pick up any homogeneous trend. Three governments became more transparent
in the years before their countries became EU members. Slovakia in 2001 and Poland in
2002 lifted restrictions on freedom of information. Slovakia also improved the legal
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environment for press freedom and Romania introduced legislation for transparent party
financing in 2003.
In addition to these improvements, we also find evidence for several instances of demo-
cratic erosion occurring at different stages of the EU accession process. Some countries
experienced important relapses in some of their democratic functions in the aftermath
of EU accession, for example the aforementioned cases of Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria,
and of the Czech Republic. However, such backslides on some democratic functions
occur not only in EU members, but also in countries with Association Agreements (e.g.
Moldova, Ukraine) and those with future membership perspectives (Albania, Serbia).
Among EU member states, they occur in those governed by populist governments (e.g.
rule of law and individual liberties in Bulgaria, Slovakia), as well as in those by non-popu-
lists (same functions, in Poland, 2009, or Romania, 2010-2012). Hence, while association
agreements are often associated with an improvement in some of the democratic func-
tions analysed, EU membership is neither a sufficient, nor a necessary condition, not
even in conjunction with further factors analysed in this article, for changes in any of
our functions of democracy. Once countries become EU members, their pathways are
very heterogeneous.
In sum, on the ladder of European integration, the most important positive steps for the
quality of democracy occur in the initial stages where countries aim for either weak or
strong commitments in order to achieve integration into the Union. Less important is
the last step – EU membership – as well as other forms of association, which do not
come with the promise of later membership. The improvements are based on the logic
of conditionality: reforms with regards to individual liberties, minority protection, rule of
law, transparency, etc. occur before, and not after reaching a new stage of integration.
Once a new step of integration is reached, the EU instruments provide little leverage,
unless the EU in in a position to reward democratic progress with even further integration.
4.3. Process 3: the consequences of the financial crisis
A third factor that is an often-cited driver of alleged regional erosion of the quality of
democracy is the global financial crisis of 2008. In particular, it has spawned significant
concerns about how young democracies can cope with economic turmoil (Bermeo and
Bartels 2014; Kriesi and Pappas 2015). The severe economic consequences which a
number of democracies in the region have suffered in the wake of the financial crisis
have direct and indirect implications for political regimes. First, they can lead to a collapse
Figure 5. The financial crisis of 2008 and the quality of democracy (selected functions) (For all 9 func-
tions, see appendix, figure B3)
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of trust in political institutions and dissatisfaction with democracy (Armingeon and Guth-
mann 2014). Second, social unrest can precipitate the collapse of governments. Third, the
preoccupation of European Union institutions with stabilising the financial sector and the
common currency reduces the Union’s capacity to deal with democracy-related issues and
precipitates enlargement fatigue, thus curtailing the enlargement effect on the quality of
democracy in not-yet member states.
In order to assess these arguments, Figure 5 plots four democratic functions before and
after 2008. However, we do not find a reversal of the regional trends after the crisis for any
of the nine functions (see also appendix, figure B3). Four countries (Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary) experienced important backslides in individual liberties
after the financial crisis, partly because of civil and political rights violations by states,
reported by Amnesty International and US State Department reports. In two countries (Bul-
garia, Slovakia), the rule of law suffered, and in Moldova the pre-existing crisis of rule of law
deepened further. In Albania and in Hungary, competition deteriorated, and the governing
parties became more dominant. However, beyond these individual cases, our more sys-
tematic assessment of political developments across the region corroborates Ekiert’s
(2013) observation that the financial crisis has not initiated an illiberal turn in Central
and Eastern Europe. Instead, this occurred only where authoritarian parties in power
managed to channel the grievances against the liberal institutions.
5. Discussion
Since the 1990s, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have seen an unusually fast
transition towards, and a consolidation of, democracy. Has this trend now started to
reverse and has the region moved into a period of de-consolidation of democratic rule,
a period of defective democracies with illiberal features? Both the academic and the
public debate have centred around such a purported anti-liberal backslide (Rupnik
2018). Prominent explanations for the perceived erosion in the quality of democracy
include the rise of populist-authoritarian parties that dominate the national governments
in several countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Brusis 2016; Bustikova and Guasti 2017),
the inability of the European Union to enforce democratic standards after countries have
been granted membership (Sedelmeier 2014; Kelemen 2017), and the economic and pol-
itical consequences of the global financial crisis of 2008 (e.g. Bermeo and Bartels 2014;
Brusis 2016).
This paper offers a new, systematic assessment of this alleged illiberal turn of Central
and Eastern European democracies. It compares the trajectory of the quality of democracy
across all democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, relying on a newly extended dataset
covering nine dimensions of the quality of democracy, which is based on objective indi-
cators. It examines the trends in the quality of democracy in light of the three above-men-
tioned explanations, analysing both the overall regional trend as well as subsets of
countries. In brief, while it finds correlational evidence consistent with purported demo-
cratic effects of populist governments and the EU accession process, it does not detect
any systematic changes associated with the financial crisis.
As regards the former, the rise of populist actors, the article finds that Central and
Eastern Europe has seen the meteoric rise of newcomer political parties long before this
trend spread to Western Europe (Sikk 2012). Some of these parties ran with a populist
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programme, and by 2016, every one of the 17 countries of the region for which we have
measures of populism available experienced at least one episode of a populist party in
government. Populists view themselves as correctors of democracy. In their eyes, the insti-
tutions of horizontal accountability, and some liberal rights are tools in the hands of
corrupt elites. They decry what they perceive to be the excessive protection of minority
rights, weakening the majoritarian principle of democracies (Houle and Kenny 2018).
Instead, they want to strengthen vertical accountability, strictly following the “will of the
people” – a combination of majoritarian and plebiscitary ideas.
The analysis of the quality of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe finds mixed
evidence for these purported effects of populists in government. In some cases, they
are clearly associated with changes in the quality of democracy: The most important pat-
terns thereof which the Democracy Barometer reports are a reduction of political com-
petition and moves towards less transparent governments during populist rule. While
our objective indicators identify, to a considerable extent, the same backsliding democ-
racies as expert-based data (Lührmann et al. 2018, 1327), the insights gained from our
analysis (limited to 2016) rebuff the alarmist view of a deep and widespread crisis of
democracy. Different from studies of other regions (Huber and Schimpf 2016b), we
identify several populist governments that have not left any mark on the quality of
democracy, while others have even made changes that reduce future opportunities to
exert popular control. However, our empirical assessment is also not in line with the
view of populists as a corrective (Huber and Ruth 2017). Developments in the quality
of democracy are not uniform in the region, and the observable footprints of popu-
list-authoritarian governments on the quality of democracy appear highly context-
dependent.
As regards the process of European integration, the article overall confirms the assess-
ment that it advances the quality of democracy in the region. This appears to occur right
before the countries take steps on the ladder of European integration, in particular in the
earlier stages of the process of European integration, when countries are aiming for either
weak or strong commitments for integration into the Union. However, after countries have
taken steps towards European integration, they can de-consolidate, owing to a lack of dis-
ciplinary instruments. Such steps backwards have occurred in EU member states (Hungary,
Slovakia, Bulgaria, and of the Czech Republic), but not only there. In many ways, the
deterioration of the public sphere and of transparency of government action under the
Vučić presidency in Serbia (outside the EU), closely resembles the deterioration of press
freedom under the Orbán administration in Hungary. In Macedonia and Serbia, govern-
ments have profited from the fragility of the political and legal institutions and the
media system. They have used democratic weaknesses to consolidate their partisan
control of the state, while dismantling liberties and horizontal controls (e.g. Esen and
Gumuscu 2016; Bieber 2018). Political pluralism in Serbia and Hungary has been erased
by dominant ruling parties, which have further consolidated their rule through changes
to electoral laws and rules on party funding.
In spite of indicating a crucial role for both populism and the EU accession process, the
article cannot confirm an overall regional trend that is attributable to the two. While drastic
cases, such as Hungary and, more recently, Poland, that highlight both the influence of
populist actors and the weakness of EU instruments are given extensive media and aca-
demic spotlight, they do not seem representative for the region. Our assessment indicates
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that there is relatively limited backsliding until 2016, which can be observed by relying on
objective quantitative data (though some important anti-constitutional moves have taken
place since, esp. in Poland, cf. Sata and Karolewski 2020). They are counterbalanced by
improvements to the quality of democracy in other cases.
None of the three explanations this article has investigated is either sufficient or necess-
ary on its own to explain erosions in the quality of democracy. If the quality of democracy
in Central and Eastern Europe is understood as a competition between the European
Union and populist-illiberal leaders, then the score remained undecided as of 2016: The
accession of CEE democracies to the EU means that the EU loses its trump card – condi-
tionality. However, the quality of democracy remains stable in most of the new EUmember
states. While the global financial crisis of 2008 slowed down enlargement, and therefore
weakened the power of the conditionality card regarding non-members, it was not fol-
lowed by a genuine backslide. The incapacity of the Union to prevent major backsliding
in member-states (Hungary, Poland) and non-members (Serbia, Ukraine) might,
however, be read as a green light to populist-authoritarian governments across Europe
to take authoritarian measures and compromise the EU’s capacity to sustain the quality
of democracy. In this way, rather than only exhibiting unsystematic, localised impacts,
the authoritarian footprints left by populist actors may be felt more strongly across the
region in the years to come.
Notes
1. We define “democratic backsliding” or “erosion of the quality of democracy” as a gradual
deterioration of democracy or some democratic principles (Waldner and Lust 2018), i.e.
changes within a political regime of democracy. Authoritarian backlashes are understood as
a process of de-democratisation.
2. But see Börzel and Schimmelfennig (2017), who study post-accession dynamics. However,
their analysis of regional and sub-regional means does not allow the identification of hetero-
geneous country developments.
3. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro (2006–2016), Poland, Romania, Serbia (2006–
2016), Serbia and Montenegro (2001–2005), Slovakia, Slovenia, the Ukraine. As for Kosovo
many indicators are missing, it is only included in parts of the analysis.
4. We also include Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Polity IV does not rate as a democracy due to
the international supervision active there. We do so because Bosnia and Herzegovina has fully
developed domestic institutions.
5. In addition, the figure also shows periods of populist parties in governing cabinets. The oper-
ationalization for this factor is discussed in section 4.1 below.
6. For instance, Latvia suffers from a lack of inclusive participation and representation. A weak
civil society, and informal practices and a deteriorating public confidence in the justice
system weaken the rule of law in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. (Bugarič and Kuhelj 2015).
7. In our supplementary material, appendix A provides corresponding results for all nine functions.
8. Alternatively, populism is seen as a “corrective” to the current state of democracy, eliminating
allegedly corrupt elites’ control of the state (through horizontal accountability, and some of
liberal rights), simultaneously freeing it from the grip of minorities, and instead strengthening
vertical accountability (Ruth and Hawkins 2017), revitalising participation, including the par-
ticipation of lower classes (Anduiza, Guinjoan, and Rico 2019).
9. Where the sources coded presidential candidates (in particular, Huber and Schimpf 2016b) or
chief executives (in particular, Hawkins 2009, 2013), we first looked up these individuals’ party
affiliations with a quick web-based search.
EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS 183
10. The sources differ slightly in their definition of populism, and we combine sources that identify
the populist left, right, and the centre. Where several sources exist for the same party, we accept a
single identification as populist as sufficient. Most sources directly code political parties in a
dichotomous way. Where previous sources used a continuous measure of populism, we define
a cut-off point (0.5 for the measures provided by (Hawkins 2009, 2013; Hawkins and Silva 2016).
11. We extrapolated the eight sources for each party in our dataset across the maximum time
period (1990–2016), regardless of their time coverage. Following our sources, our aggregated
measure allows for changes in a particular party’s populism status over time. We did not extrap-
olate across a party year if at least one source codes a change in the populist status at that point.
For example, van Kessel (2015) codes the Hungarian Fidesz party as populist only from 2006
(and as not populist before). Consequently, we did not extrapolate any other source’s
measure (for which some of the election periods were missing) across this time period.
12. Even though we combined a large number of sources to obtain as broad a coverage as poss-
ible, we were still unable to code populist status for a number of mostly smaller or more
recently-emerged parties. In order to keep a maximum of information in, we kept country
years where at least one governing party is populist (and where, according to our measure,
the maximum degree of populist power access is thus already achieved, no matter how
any missing parties are coded), and country years for which we have populist status data of
at least two-thirds of the governing coalitions’ seats (i.e., if we lacked data on a small coalition
partner. If the size of the uncoded coalition partner was at least 33% of the total seat share of
the governing coalition, we discarded the country-year). Out of a total of 988 parties that form
the basis of the country years in our analysis, we have populism data for 861.
13. Defined as governments with a seat share of 67% or larger in parliament, under participation
of populists. We follow Huber & Schimpf’s argument according to which the presence of at
least one populist party in government suffices to decisively influence policy outcomes. For
simplicity’s sake we do not consider the special case of surplus cabinets where populist gov-
ernment parties have an arguably smaller influence (Huber and Schimpf 2016a).
14. See model results reported in Online Appendix B, calculated for all functions with at least ten
separate periods.
15. We find significant coefficients for populist governments or oppositions in our full models
(appendix, tables B1a and B1b), e.g. on competition or constraints, or representation. Where
these coefficients are minuscule and are attained in specifications without controls for time-
variant confounders, we do not consider them as sufficient evidence for a discussion in the paper.
16. We omit Neighbourhood Policy. Our sample contains too few country years for this weakest
form of integration.
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